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Hyatt: Release-Dismissal Agreement Validity - From Per Se Invalidity to
1994]
RELEASE-DISMISSAL AGREEMENT VALIDITY-FRoM PFR SE
INVALIDITY TO CONDITIONAL VALIDITY, AND Now TURNING
BACK TO PER SE INVALIDITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

For many years, the judicial system has encouraged disposing of legal
disputes outside the courtroom.' Release-dismissal agreements have become a commonly-used devise for the resolution of legal disputes between
a prosecuting attorney and a criminal defendant.2 In such agreements the
prosecutor seeks from the defendant a waiver of the right to bring a civil
action.3 In exchange, the prosecutor assures the defendant that criminal
charges will be dismissed. 4 Release-dismissal agreements have recently
1. Seth F. Kreimer, Releases, Redress, and Police Misconduct: Reflections on Agreements to Waive Civil Rights Actions in Exchangefor Dismissal of CriminalCharges, 136 U.
PA. L. REv. 851, 852 (1988) (discussing out-of-court negotiations, specifically in

civil rights cases).
2. Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc., 620 P.2d 628, 633 (Cal. 1980) (labeling as

"routine" use of release-dismissal agreements in California misdemeanor cases); see
also The Supreme Court-1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARv. L. REV. 119, 311

(1987) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (describing release-dismissal agreements as
common arrangements between prosecutors and defendants); cf Boyd v. Adams,
513 F.2d 83, 85 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975) (noting prosecutor supplied Chicago Police

Department with standardized release form). But see Kreimer, supra note 1, at 86465 (noting decrease in use of release-dismissal agreements in various police
departments).
3. Elizabeth Pascale Francis, Note, Trading Civil Rights Claims for Dismissal of
Criminal Charges: Release-Dismissal Agreements Town of Newton v. Rumery, 17 STETSON L. REv. 491, 511 (1987) (stating that prosecutors hope defendants will waive

rights to civil rights actions against police officers through release-dismissal
agreements).
4. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (stating prosecutor agreed to drop charges of tampering with witness if criminal defendant agreed
in exchange to drop charges alleging town and officers violated defendant's constitutional rights); Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205 (3d Cir.
1993) (stating prosecutor orally agreed to move for judgment of acquittal for
charges of terroristic threats and assault and to pay medical and household damage bills in exchange for defendant's release of all civil claims); Hill v. City of
Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that city prosecutor agreed to dismiss criminal charges for obstructing official justice, aggravated disorderly conduct
and resisting arrest in exchange for criminal defendant's waiver of civil claim
against city and officers); Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating prosecutor agreed to dismiss criminal charges following defendant's completion of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition Program in exchange for release of
civil rights action stemming from alleged police misconduct during defendant's
arrest), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1303 (1994); Vallone v. Lee, 7 F.3d 196 (11th Cir.
1993) (recounting that assistant district attorney agreed to discharge jail detainee
after being imprisoned for misdemeanor charges, if detainee signed agreement
releasing sheriff from any liability or damages); Coughlen v. Coots, 5 F.3d 970 (6th
Cir. 1993) (recounting that prosecutor agreed to dismiss charges of assault of police officer, resisting arrest and public intoxication in exchange for defendant's
release of civil rights action, alleging unlawful arrest, excessive force and malicious
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generated great controversy. 5 Critics claim that these agreements conflict
with two basic goals of the American justice system: punishing criminals
and protecting private citizens' civil rights. 6 In the context of release-dismissal agreements, these goals would be achieved by a prosecutor bringing
criminal charges and a private citizen bringing suit under § 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (section 1983),7 respectively.8 Critics of releaseprosecution); Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining prosecutor agreed to drop criminal charges in exchange for defendant's release of civil
claims against city); Berry v. Peterson, 887 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating county

agreed to pay medical bills, drop arson charges and recommend probation for
four felony offenses pending in exchange for defendant's release of civil suit

against county, county board of supervisors and sheriff); Lynch v. City of Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating district attorney agreed not to initiate
criminal charges against arrestee if arrestee agreed not to bring civil action against
city); Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting criminal defendant
signed release waiving right to bring civil action against county in exchange for
$500); Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating Deputy Assistant State's
Attorney agreed to dismiss criminal charges of disorderly conduct and resisting
olice officer in exchange for criminal defendant's release of civil rights action
ased on illegal arrest and search, unlawful imprisonment and physical brutality).
5. Erin P. Bartholomy, Note, An Ethical Analysis of the Release-DismissalAgreement, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 331, 331 (1993) (stating releasedismissal agreements, as well as variations, have been controversial topic for several
years, and identifying supporters' and opponents' positions on issue).
6. See generally Richard Abel, Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law? 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 375, 381-83 (1985) (stating informal resolution deprives poor
criminal defendants of only source of power, protection and formal law); Albert
W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the
Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1808, 1835-36 (1986)
(observing managerial judging may threaten fair operation of judici al system);
Kreimer, supra note 1, at 902-05 (asserting various criticisms of release-dismissal
agreements); Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 352-55 (arguing release-dismissal agreements are unethical); Francis, supra note 3, at 515 (criticizing release-dismissal
agreements); Christopher L. Rogan, Note, The PretrialRelease-DismissalAgreement as
a Prosecutorial Too4"Town of Newton v. Rumery, 10 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 513,
524-25 (1993) (same).
7. Section 1983 states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
8. See Rogan, supra note 6, at 526 (noting that Congress sought to create forum for redress of constitutional rights violations). The courts have recognized
that the public prosecutor aids in assuring that criminal offenders do not escape
justice and that innocent persons do not suffer. Id. at 522 (citing Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). In order to achieve these goals, the government
must prosecute those who have not adhered to state and federal laws. Id. The
legislature enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to
curb state officials from depriving individuals of their constitutional rights. Id. at
525-26; see also Rumey, 480 U.S. at 395 (emphasizing that § 1983 was enacted to
vindicate constitutional rights and expose police misconduct); Allen v. McCurry,
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dismissal agreements assert that the agreements may both hinder criminal
punishment 9 and prevent vindication of civil rights violations. 10 By contrast, proponents of release-dismissal agreements argue that the agreements promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the legal system by
reducing criminal and civil litigation."
449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980) (noting state courts' failure to protect federal rights
provided motivation for enactment of § 1983); Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 651 (1980) (stating purpose underlying § 1983 provides protection to
persons wronged by misuse of governmental power); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 239 (1972) (finding § 1983 offered federal remedy against "incursions under
the claimed authority of state law"); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1960)
(recognizing § 1983 provided federal remedy for enforcement of Fourteenth
Amendment rights); United States v. City of Phila., 644 F.2d 187, 198 (3d Cir.
1980) (acknowledging that through § 1983, Congress has established "comprehensive and detailed remedial structure for the protection of constitutional rights").
Representative Shellabarger of Ohio, the sponsor of § 1983, stated that the
section was adopted to enforce Fourteenth Amendment protections. Richard A.
Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical
Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741, 769 (1987) (quoting Rep. Shellabarger, CONG.
GLOBE,

42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 68 (1871)). The goal of the Act was to preserve

human rights and liberties. Id. Ultimately, the purpose of § 1983 was to create a

remedy for official misconduct. Francis, supra note 3, at 511.
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the language of § 1983
broadly to include official misconduct violative of state law. Monroe, 365 U.S. at
180. As a result of such a broad interpretation, the number of § 1983 suits alleging
official misconduct such as unlawful arrest, unlawful search and seizure, and excessive force, have increased since 1961. Leading Cases, supra note 2, at 310; see also
Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 452 (1978) (noting different types of police misconduct); Project, Suing the Police in FederalCourt, 88 YALE L.J.
781, 781 n.3 (1979) (noting increase in § 1983 claims against police officers).
9. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 409 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (stating criminal defendant
is not yet proven guilty, nor is private citizen guaranteed to win civil rights claim).
In these cases criminal punishment and civil rights vindication cannot be hindered. Id. But see Patzer v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1985) (recounting that
paraplegic was unconstitutionally arrested in home without warrant, handcuffed
and dragged to police car); Stone v. City of Chicago, 738 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir.
1984) (noting after police car hit plaintiff, police pushed plaintiff, verbally abused
him and physically beat him); Garrick v. City & County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969,
970 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that police stopped plaintiff for traffic violation,
searched plaintiff's car for drugs, then shot plaintiff); Kreimer, supranote 1, at 851
n.112 (stating legitimate § 1983 claims abound); Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 335
n.170 (stating many legitimate constitutional violation claims associated with arrest
exist, using "Rodney King" issue as example); Rogan, supranote 6, at 531 (stating
that "[in situations where a release agreement is negotiated with an innocent
criminal defendant who had a civil rights claim, society's interests are once again
forfeited").
10. Francis, supra note 3, at 496. In the case of release-dismissal agreements,
the criminal defendant usually waives his or her right to bring a § 1983 claim alleging police misconduct in exchange for the dismissal of criminal charges. Id. Release-dismissal agreements result in the reduction of litigation. Id.
11. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 395-96; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 & n.13
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (interpreting § 1983 narrowly in response to "striking" escalation of § 1983 suits, and resultant trivialization of federal courts into
"small-claims tribunals"); Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 724
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Federal courts have also been in conflict on this issue. Although
many courts criticized release-dismissal agreements in the past, 12 federal
courts currently accept their use in certain instances.' 3 This Casebrief dis(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing Monroe as "fountainhead of the torrent of civil rights litigation of the last 17 years"). Trivial claims continue to find
their way into the federal courts more and more quickly. Susanah M. Mead, Evolution of the "Species of Tort Liability" Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can ConstitutionalTort
be Savedfrom Extinction?,-55 FoRDHAm L. Riv. 1, 12-13 (1986). Nevertheless, § 1983

is still needed to protect essential civil rights. Id. at 13. Even those who desire a per
se rule of invalidity concede that release-dismissal agreements contribute "fiscal
and administrative savings." See Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 331 (noting Justice
O'Connor, in calling for invalidity of release-dismissal agreements, recognized
cost-effectiveness); see also Rogan, supra note 6, at 531 (acknowledging fiscal and
administrative savings as only benefit of release-dismissal agreements). But see

Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1985) (commenting that
courts will have to expend increasing amounts of resources to critique validity of
each release-dismissal using case-by-case analysis method), rev'd, 480 U.S. 386
(1987); Leading Cases, supra note 2, at 316 (stating that "empirical evidence shows
...that the concern with the number of section 1983 claims on federal dockets is
misplaced; the burden created by the statute appears neither inordinate nor unmanageable"); Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: DoctrinalFoundationsand an EmpiricalStudy, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482, 524 (1982) (finding total number of § 1983
claims filed in Central District of California in certain years was not overabundant); William Bennett Turner, When PrisonersSue: A Study of PrisonerSection 1983
Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARv. L. lEv. 610, 637 (1979) (reporting many prisoner § 1983 claims are summarily dismissed and therefore do not overburden federal courts). See generally FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE
A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 179-212 (1969) (discussing reasons to discontinue proceedings so as to reduce cost to criminal system).
12. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1278 (2d Cir. 1986) (dictum) (noting cases condemning release-dismissal agreements), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 918 (1987); Rumery, 778 F.2d at 71 (stating particular release-dismissal agreement is per se void); Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1431 (10th Cir.
1984) (stating release-dismissal agreements deprive criminal defendants of due
process), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985); Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 88 (7th Cir.
1975) (holding agreement void as against public policy); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding agreement compelling appellant to abandon § 1983 claim void even if district did not prosecute appellant's
outstanding violations).
13. See, e.g., Rumeiy, 480 U.S. at 391 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating caseby-case determination is needed to decide if release-dismissal is valid and stating
that "wide variety of factual situations . . . can result in release-dismissal agreements"); Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205, 1211 (3d Cir.
1993) (stating release-dismissal agreement may be valid depending upon facts and
circumstances surrounding case and quoting Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v.
City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1095 (3d Cir. 1988)); Hill v. City of Cleveland, 12 F.3d
575 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding release-dismissal agreement); Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that although Rumeiy rejected view
stating release-dismissal agreements were per se adverse to public interest, "[w] e see
no reason to embrace the opposite extreme that voluntary release-dismissal agreements are per se beneficial to the public interest"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1303
(1994); Vallone v. Lee, 7 F.3d 196, 199 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting Rumey clarified
that not all release-dismissal agreements are invalid); Coughlen v. Coots, 5 F.3d
970, 975 (6th Cir. 1993) (listing instances when release-dismissal would be valid
prosecutorial tool); Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing
ustice O'Connor's observation that courts must engage in case-by-case analysis in
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cusses the development of the law concerning release-dismissal agreements. First, Part II examines the early resistance to the use of releasedismissal agreements. 14 Part III explains the criteria the United States
Supreme Court established, in Town of Newton v. Rumery, 15 to determine
the validity of release-dismissal agreements.' 6 Next, Part IV addresses the
circuit courts of appeals' interpretations of the Rumery criteria." 7 Part V
discusses the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's recent
interpretation of this criteria.' 8 Lastly, Part VI analyzes the effect of the
Rumery criteria and of the circuit courts' interpretations of that criteria on
future Third Circuit decisions. 19
II.

THE TREND IN LOWER COURTS PRIOR TO

TowN OF

NEwoN v. RuiF-eRY

Before the Supreme Court addressed the validity of pre-conviction release-dismissal agreements, 20 the lower courts tended to invalidate the
agreements. 2 1 For instance, in 1968, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia was one of the first circuits to address the
validity of release-dismissal agreements. 22 The D.C. Circuit found that the
determining whether release-dismissal agreement is valid in Rumeyy); Berry v. Peterson, 887 F.2d 635, 641 (5th Cir. 1989) (enforcing release-dismissal agreement);
Lynch v. City of Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding releasedismissal agreement enforceable if in public's best interest).
14. For a discussion of the past prejudice against release-dismissal agreements, see infra notes 20-75 and accompanying text.

15. 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
16. For a discussion of the criteria that the United States Supreme Court established in Rumey, see infra notes 76-109 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the circuit courts of appeals' interpretations of the

criteria in determining whether a release-dismissal agreement is valid, see infra
notes 110-34 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's evaluations of criteria used in determining whether a release-dismissal agreement is valid, see infra notes 135-72 and
accompanying text.

19. For a discussion of the effect the criteria will have on future Third Circuit
cases, see infra notes 173-94 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the Rumepy decision, see infra notes 76-109. Post-conviction release-dismissal agreements should be distinguished from pre-conviction
agreements. Bushnell v. Rossetti, 750 F.2d 298, 301 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding release in exchange for post-conviction sentencing recommendation is not against
public policy, but pre-conviction release-dismissal agreements are per se invalid);
Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1981) (allowing post-conviction release-dismissal agreement when voluntary, deliberate and informed).
21. See, e.g., Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding release-dismissal agreement per se void), rev'd, 480 U.S. 386 (1987); Boyd v.
Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 88 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding release-dismissal agreement void
as against public policy); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (holding invalid appellant's agreement not to proceed with § 1983
claim, even if prosecutor did not prosecute appellant's outstanding violations); see
also Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 334-35 (stating that at least one court has held
release-dismissal agreements are never valid).

22. Dixon, 394 F.2d at 969.
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agreements were against public policy, and thus, per se invalid because the
agreements forced criminal defendants to waive their rights to a civil acdon.2 3 Similarly, two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit held release-dismissal agreements void.2 4 Shortly thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit followed
suit and also held pre-conviction release-dismissal agreements void.25 In
addition, other district and state courts have2 6concluded that pre-conviction release-dismissal agreements are invalid.
The circuit courts have invalidated pre-conviction release-dismissal
agreements based on several public interests.2 7 First, the circuit courts
have noted that release-dismissal agreements hinder citizens from expressing legal complaints against police misconduct because the agreements
23. Id. The police stopped a man for alleged traffic violations. Id. at 968.
Subsequent to the arrest, the police neither arrested nor charged the man. Id.
The prosecutor pressed charges only after the man breached a tacit agreement
that the prosecutor would not proceed if the man arrested did not bring a civil
complaint against the police that stopped him. Id. at 968-69. The court held the
agreement was void even if the district did not prosecute the man's outstanding
violations. Id.
24. MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852

(1970).
25. Boyd, 513 F.2d at 88. Police stopped a car in which the plaintiff was a

passenger and violently arrested her and placed her in jail. Id. at 85. The plaintiff
was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. Id. She had a miscarriage soon after her arrest. Id. The plaintiff claims that on her court date she was
forced to release the police and city from liability in return for a dismissal of the
criminal charges against her. Id.
26. See, e.g., Shepard v. Byrd, 581 F. Supp. 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding
release-dismissal agreement invalid); Brothers v. Rosauer's Supermarkets, Inc., 545
F. Supp. 1041 (D. Mont. 1982) (same); Home v. Pane, 514 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (same); Williamsen v.Jernberg, 240 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (declaring void note executed as consideration for agreement not to prosecute); Gray v.
City of Galesburg, 247 N.W.2d 338 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (holding agreement invalid because it is "repugnant to public policy"). But see Hoines v. Barney's Club,
Inc., 620 P.2d 628, 635 (Cal. 1980) (upholding release-dismissal agreement that
allowed dismissal of misdemeanor charges); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Joy, 389 A.2d
874 (Md. 1978) (holding release-dismissal agreement valid).
27. See, e.g., Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding
release-dismissal agreements per se void as against public policy because they promote prosecutorial misconduct, prevent vindication of civil rights and release
criminals from just punishment), rev'd, 480 U.S. 386 (1987); Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that although Rumery rejected view
declaring release-dismissal agreements per se adverse to public interest, "[w] e see
no reason to embrace the opposite extreme that voluntary release-dismissal agreements are per se beneficial to the public interest"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1303
(1994); Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201, 1204-06 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting possible
existence of unfair coercion to sign release-dismissal agreement against will); Boyd
v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 88 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating release-dismissal agreements are
inherently coercive and deter people from exercising their right to protest official
misconduct); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(stating release-dismissal agreements set criminals free and prevent citizens from
achieving redress for police misconduct); see also Bartholomy, supranote 5, at 33135 (stating reasons that release-dismissal agreements are against public policy).
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bar potentially meritorious section 1983 claims. 28 Second, the circuit
courts have stated that release-dismissal agreements promote potential
prosecutorial misconduct.2 9 Specifically, the circuit courts have been concerned with the inflation or invention of criminal charges, 3 0 the protection of government agents from personal liability3 l and the lack of public
32
disclosure of official misconduct.
A.

The Importance of Section 1983 Claims

Many circuit courts have determined that release-dismissal agree33
ments prevent citizens from complaining about police misconduct.
Commentators claim that this result is constitutionally unjust and defeats
the purposes of section 1983.3 4 Because of such harmful results, both
courts and commentators have voiced arguments against validating release-dismissal agreements.3 5
The most basic premise against release-dismissal agreements remains
that they advocate constitutionally invalid state action.36 The state action
in implementing release-dismissal agreements is constitutionally invalid
because the agreements hinder the right to litigate legitimate section 1983
28. Boyd, 513 F.2d at 88-89; Dixon, 394 F.2d at 969.
29. MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir.) (stating prosecutor
may not use criminal prosecution to forestall civil proceedings against police), cert.

denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); North Am. Cold Storage v. County of Cook, 531 F.
Supp. 1003, 1009-10 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Francis, supra note 3, at 497.
30. MacDonald, 425 F.2d at 375 (holding prosecutor's attempt to use weak

case to prevent possible civil claim against police unethical and improper).
31. North Am. Cold Storage, 531 F. Supp. at 1009-10 (noting prosecutor attempted to protect government agents from liability).
32. Id.
33. Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1303 (1994); Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd,
480 U.S. 386 (1987); Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 88-89 (7th Cir. 1975); Dixon v.
District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See generally Kreimer,
supra note 1, at 865-931 (arguing release-dismissal agreements bar legitimate
§ 1983 claims); Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 358-62 (same); Francis, supra note 3,
at 497 (same); Rogan, supra note 6, at 525-26 (same).
34. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-52 (1980); see also
Kreimer, supranote 1, at 865-931 (addressing alleged benefits of release-dismissal
agreements for accused); Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 358-62 (interpreting § 1983
and its legislative purposes); Francis, supra note 3, at 491 (addressing alleged benefits of release-dismissal agreements for accused); Rogan, supra note 6, at 525-26
(same). For a discussion of the content, history and purpose of § 1983, see supra
notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
35. Cain, 7 F.3d at 383 (holding release-dismissal agreement valid only when
public interest requirement met); Rumery, 778 F.2d at 71 (holding release-dismissal
agreement per sevoid);Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating
release-dismissal agreement only valid if entered into voluntarily); Boyd, 513 F.2d at
88 (holding release-dismissal agreements void as against public policy); Dixon, 394
F.2d at 969 (same). See generally Kreimer, supra note 1, at 865-931 (arguing against
use of release-dismissal agreements); Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 358-62 (same);
Francis, supra note 3, at 515-16 (same); Rogan, supra note 6, at 521-31 (same).
36. Kreimer, supra note 1, at 894.
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claims. Historically, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the
right of access to the courts in order to exercise First Amendment rights to
petition for redress of grievances. 3 7 As a result, states cannot prosecute
the act of bringing a civil rights action as a criminal offense.8 8 Therefore,
commentators argue that prosecutors cannot constitutionally use releasedismissal agreements to prevent a criminal defendant from bringing a civil
39
action.
In addition, the Supreme Court has found that release-dismissal
agreements defeat the congressional purposes behind section 1983.40 Section 1983 has two major purposes. 4 1 First, section 1983 provides citizens a
federal remedy against officials who, through the power of their official
positions, have deprived those citizens of constitutional rights. 42 Second,
43
section 1983 deters police misconduct against citizens.
37. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978) (citing United Transportation
Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971)) (stating First Amendment protects fundamental right to meaningful access to courts); California Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (declaring right of petition
includes access to courts); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377
U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (holding state statute that indirectly bars union members from
vindicating legal rights in court impairs First Amendment right to petition in
court); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922) (holding state may
not exact waiver of constitutional right to access federal courts); see also Kreimer,
supra note 1, at 893 (stating every person should have right to litigate legitimate
claim).
38. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438-39 (holding attempt to discipline attorney
for approaching prospective client to encourage bringing civil rights suit violated
First Amendment); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (holding state statute that hinders NAACP attorneys seeking legal redress violates First Amendment).
39. Kreimer, supra note 1, at 894.
40. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980); Kreimer,
supra note 1, at 917-18; Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 358-62; Francis, supranote 3,
at 494-96; Rogan, supra note 6, at 525-26. For a discussion of § 1983 generally, see
supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
41. Owen, 445 U.S. at 651-52; Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 358-62; see also
Kreimer, supra note 1, at 917 (noting that Congress sought to provide federal judicial forum); Francis, supra note 3, at 495 (observing that Congress' power for enacting § 1983 lay in protecting citizens from "unconstitutional action under color
of law"); Rogan, supra note 6, at 526 (noting Congress' intent to "create civil liability for wrongful state actions" and to provide forum for citizens denied constitutional rights). For a discussion of § 1983 generally, see supra notes 6-8 and
accompanying text.
42. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-54 (1978) (stating compensation for
victims of official misconduct constitutes basic purpose of § 1983 damages awards);
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972) (stating § 1983 enacted to enforce
Fourteenth Amendment limitations against government action); Leading Cases,
supranote 2, at 310 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)) (discussing § 1983 and validity
of release-dismissal agreements). Some commentators have gone so far as to state
§ 1983 should be repealed if release-dismissal agreements are allowed. Town of
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 419 (1987) (StevensJ., dissenting). For a further
discussion of § 1983 purposes, see supra notes 34-41 and infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
43. Owen, 445 U.S. at 650-52. Congress wanted to provide a federal remedy to
private individuals. Id. This wish stemmed partially from the Southern states' gov-
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The first congressional purpose of section 1983 allows individuals to
44
exercise a federal right to freely air complaints against public officials.
The Supreme Court has recognized that in signing release-dismissal agreements, citizens exchange their constitutional right to a federal remedy for
their freedom from criminal charges. 45 Thus, after criminal defendants
enter into a release-dismissal agreement, they contractually waive the fundamental right to redress of complaints against officials that section 1983
provides. 46 In Town of Newton v. Rumevy, the Supreme Court determined
47
that Congress never intended such an outcome.
The second purpose underlying section 1983 is to deter police misconduct toward citizens. 48 The Supreme Court found that release-dismissal agreements actually foster police misconduct. 49 Prosecutors, working
closely with police officers, generally feel a loyalty and duty to protect poemnment failure to enforce the laws protecting minority citizens from constitutional rights violations. Id.; see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980)
(asserting primary reason for enactment of § 1983 was to deter government and
police officials who were Ku Klux Klan sympathizers); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 170-76 (1961) (acknowledging state courts had not been protecting federal
rights to civil actions); Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of
IndividualRights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or FadeAway?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6

(1985) (stating "unwillingness of the States to protect the freedman or citizens of
States" made § 1983 necessary); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federal-

ism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1154-55 (1977) (stating "full reading of the debates
compels the conclusion that the Act [§ 1983] was aimed at least as much at the
abdication of law enforcement responsibilities by Southern officials as it was at the
Klan's outrages"); see also Rogan, supranote 6, at 521, 525-26 (discussing purposes
for enacting § 1983). For a general discussion of § 1983, see supra notes 6-8 and
accompanying text.
44. Allen, 449 U.S. at 98-99 (stating Congress intended § 1983 to override the
"corrupting influence of Ku Klux Klan and its sympathizers on governments and
law enforcement agencies of Southern States" and to remedy states' deficiencies in
roviding federal relief for violations of constitutional rights) (citing Monroe v.
ape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1960)); Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 88 (7th Cir. 1975)
(stating "[giovernment may not prosecute for the purpose of deterring people
from exercising their right to protest official misconduct and petition for redress
of grievances and quoting Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 968-69
(D.C. Cir. 1968)); see also Rogan, supra note 6, at 526 (discussing purposes of
§ 1983).
45. For a further discussion of the procedure and function of release-dismissal agreements, see supra notes 2-4, 7-8 and accompanying text.
46. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396-98 (1986) (concluding release-dismissal agreements that are voluntarily entered into must be enforced). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 18-23 (1982) (stating contractual provisions require mutual assent);JoHN C.JEvRIES,JL & PETER W. Low, CiviL
RIGHTS ACTIONS 429 (1988) (stating unequal bargaining power of prosecutor and
criminal defendant in release-dismissal agreement renders agreement suspect).
47. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 386; Allen, 449 U.S. at 98-99.
48. Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980). For a further discussion of § 1983 and its historical purposes, see supra notes 5-8, 40-47 and

accompanying text.
49. Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 89 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating official misconduct should be "thoroughly aired in a free society" through § 1983 claims and
quoting Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
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lice officers. 50 The Court noted that police officers, with confidence in
the prosecutors' protection, are more likely to act beyond the bounds of
51
their positions and engage in police misconduct.
B.

The Fear of ProsecutorialMisconduct

Several courts and commentators recognize that in addition to
preventing section 1983 claims, release-dismissal agreements create potential for abuse of prosecutorial discretion. 52 These abuses include, first,
inflation or creation of criminal charges, 53 second, protection of government agents from personal liability,54 and third, lack of public disclosure
of official misconddtct. 55 In order to prevent these abuses, several courts
56
have determined that release-dismissal agreements should be void.
First, courts and commentators have stressed that release-dismissal
agreements give rise to the possibility of prosecutors inflating or creating
criminal charges. 57 The Supreme Court stated that prosecutors are given
"the power to employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any
given individual,"5 8 and consequently, prosecutors retain broad discretion
to press and drop charges. 59 Nonetheless, courts and commentators
50. Francis, supra note 3, at 511. For a discussion of prosecutors' use of release-dismissal agreements to protect government officials, see supra notes 29-32
and accompanying text.
51. Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 359 n.158.
52. Francis, supra note 3, at 497. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373,
375 (9th Cir.) (reprimanding prosecutors who use release-dismissal agreements
for illegitimate purposes such as forestalling civil proceeding by defendant against
police), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970). See generally MILLER, supra note 11, at 293345 (discussing prosecutor discretion generally); Kreimer, supra note 1 (same);
Bartholomy, supra note 5 (arguing release-dismissal agreements are unethical);
Francis, supra note 3 (same); Rogan, supra note 6 (discussing prosecutor discretion
generally).
53. MacDonald, 425 F.2d at 375 (holding prosecutor's use of release-dismissal
agreement to protect police unethical and improper).
54. Francis, supra note 3, at 500. For a discussion of prosecutors' use of release-dismissal agreements to protect government officials, see supra notes 29-32
and accompanying text.
55. North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. County of Cook, 531 F. Supp. 1003, 100910 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
56. Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding releasedismissal agreement invalid), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1303 (1994); Rumery v. Town
of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding release-dismissal agreement per
se void), rev'd, 480 U.S. 386 (1987); Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 88-89 (7th Cir.
1975) (same); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(same); see also Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 352-58 (explaining ethical reasons why
release-dismissal agreements should be per se void).
57. MacDonald, 425 F.2d at 375.
58. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils SA., 481 U.S. 787, 813-15

(1987) (holding that counsel for party that is beneficiary of court order may not be
appointed to undertake contempt prosecutions for alleged violations of that
order).
59. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (concluding that passive enforcement policy did not violate the First or Fifth Amendment); United
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counterargue that prosecutors also have a public duty to use their discre6°
tion to enforce criminal laws and to maintain order in the community.
61
Therefore, constraints on prosecutorial power must-and do-exist.
These limitations force prosecutors to administer the criminal laws
62
fairly.
The Ninth and D.C. Circuits have determined that to enforce laws
fairly, prosecutors should not be permitted to forestall a criminal defendant's civil proceeding against law enforcement officers. 63 Both circuits
state that this constraint should apply even if the criminal charges are
based on the same events as the civil suit.6 4 Also, these courts noted that
States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 (1982) (holding facts did not warrant presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness); MacDonald, 425 F.2d at 375; BRIAN A.
GROSMAN, THE PROSECUTOR 37-40 (1969) (discussing prosecutors' power to withdraw charges); Rogan, supra note 6, at 521-25 (stating "courts and legislatures have
granted the criminal prosecutor a great deal of discretion" including "deciding
who, when and how to prosecute"). But seeABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTCE
3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) (stating prosecutor's duty is to "seek justice, not merely to
convict"); ED HAGAN & DAVID M. NISsMAN, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 10 (1982)
(stating "[s] ound discretion must be used in the pursuit ofjustice which must over-

ride the mere desire to convict").
60. Rumery v. Town of Newton, 480 U.S. 386, 412, 415 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating prosecutor's primary duty is to "represent the sovereign's interest in evenhanded and effective enforcement of its criminal laws" and "[t] here will
be cases in which the prosecutor has a plain duty to obtain critical testimony despite the desire of the witness to remain anonymous or to avoid a courtroom confrontation with an offender"); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935) (stating U.S. Attorney represents government and his or her interest is that
justice be served in criminal cases); HAGAN & NISSMAN, supra note 59, at 11 (maintaining prosecutor has duty to investigate crimes committed in jurisdiction but has
sole discretion regarding decision to bring charges); MITLER, supra note 11, at 295
(stating prosecutor makes "charging decisions which reflect community values ...
accurately and effectively"); Rogan, supra note 6, at 521 (noting prosecutor has
broad discretion so he can "accomplish the objective administration of state laws").
61. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1978) (stating threats to
reindict defendant on more serious charges if he refused to plead guilty were constitutionally improper and citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725
(1968)); Rogan, supranote 6, at 521 (stating "discretion afforded the prosecutor is
not absolute"); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.8(a)
(1993) (requiring prosecutor to "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrY DR 7-103 (1993) (stating "public prosecutor or other government
lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows
or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause"); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1993) (stating "government lawyer
who has discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain from instituting or
continuing litigation that is obviously unfair"). But see Bartholomy, supranote 5, at
354 (stating Code of Professional Responsibility "is largely silent on the special
duties of prosecutors").
62. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88; Rogan, supra note 6, at 521-22 (explaining prosecutor must stay within proper scope of authority).
63. MacDonald,425 F.2d at 375; Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966,
969 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that court is not foreclosed from granting immunity
from prosecution in order to deter blatant government misconduct).
64. MacDonald, 425 F.2d at 375; Dixon, 394 F.2d at 969.
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the prosecutor should not be allowed to "trump up charges" to use later in
bargaining for suppression of a section 1983 complaint. 65 The Supreme
Court has emphasized that the limitations of prosecutorial power would
help ensure equal and fair enforcement of the laws without personal bias
66
or sympathy.
Secondly, commentators have noted that because prosecutors often
work closely with police officers, they may improperly shield those officers
from liability for civil rights violations. 6 7 Accordingly, prosecutors may
abuse the prosecutorial discretion inherent in release-dismissal agreements in order to protect police officers. 68 Critics retort that this protection remains unnecessary because public officials are generally immune to
civil liability when the circumstances justify sovereign immunity. 69 Therefore, these commentators have found that government officials do not
need the additional shield from liability that release-dismissal agreements
provide. 70 Nevertheless, this immunity does not apply where "a reasonable person would see that a clearly established statutory or constitutional
'71
right has been violated.
Finally, some courts have recognized that release-dismissal agreements encourage the concealment of information concerning police misconduct. 72 Public disclosure of such misconduct would clearly
substantially embarrass those police officers involved, as well as their fami65. Dixon, 394 F.2d at 969; Rogan, supra note 6, at 522 (stating prosecutor
must assure that innocent criminal defendants do not suffer).
66. Rogan, supra note 6, at 523 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
110-11 (1976) and arguing prosecutor must objectively pursue justice).

67. Dixon, 394 F.2d at 969 (stating concern that prosecutor did not prosecute
criminal defendant because of desire to protect police); Rogan, supra note 6, at
531 (explaining "[iJn many cases, the prosecutor's sole motivation [for entering
into a release-dismissal agreement] will be the financial and professional benefit of
the police officers"). See generallyBartholomy, supra note 5, at 354-55 (stating Code
of Professional Conduct designed to prevent instances such as prosecutor protect-

ing police officers by implementing release-dismissal agreement). For a discussion
on prosecutors using release-dismissal agreements to protect government officials,

see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.

68. See generally Kreimer, supra note 1 (stating immunity should not exist if
police officer knew he or she was violating someone's constitutional rights);
Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 360-61 (same).
69. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (holding government officials are often immune from damage suits when their special status requires them

to perform certain actions); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976)

(holding state prosecutor is immune from § 1983 liability if he or she acted within
scope of his or her duties); Gray v. City of Galesburg, 247 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Mich.

Ct. App. 1976) (stating if police acted properly, laws will fully protect them);
Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 361-62 n.164 (stating officers generally have immunity
to civil suits if they performed properly in line of duty).
70. See generally Kreimer, supra note 1; Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 360-61.
71. Francis, supra note 3, at 501. Even prosecutors are not immune to civil

liability for a willful deprivation of constitutional rights. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429.
72. North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Cook County, 531 F. Supp. 1003, 1009-10
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
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lies. 73 Thus, prosecutors may be tempted to stop criminal defendants
from litigating claims of police misconduct. 74 In fact, federal courts have
concluded that the potential exists for prosecutors to use release-dismissal
agreements to suppress information concerning police misconduct from
75
public knowledge.
III.

TowN OF NEwTON v. RUMFRy: THE SUPREME COURT CHANGES
THE TREND

76

In Town of Newton v. Rummy, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judicial trend of holding release-dismissal agreements per se invalid. 77 In Rumety, the prosecutor pressed charges against Rumery, the
criminal defendant, for tampering with a witness. 78 Later, the prosecutor
offered to dismiss the charges against Rumery, if Rumery would waive his
right to a civil claim against the police. 79 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit followed the trend in the lower courts and declared pre-conviction release-dismissal agreements per se invalid. 80 On
appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the First Circuit decision. 81 In a
five to four decision, the plurality held that per se invalidation of releasedismissal agreements should not be the standard;82 instead, each case
83
should be decided on its unique facts.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. For commentaries discussing Town of Newton v. Rumery, see Brian L.
Fielkow, 42 U.S.C. § 1983-BuyingJustice: The Role of Release-DismissalAgreements in
the CriminalJustice System, 78 J. CuiM. L. & CIlMINOLOcW 1121 (1988); Kreimer,
supra note 1; Bartholomy, supra note 5; Francis, supra note 3; Rogan, supra note 6.
77. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd, 480 U.S.
386 (1987).
81. Rume y, 480 U.S. at 386.
82. Id. at 387-88. The Supreme Court did not decide Town of Newton v.
Rumeiy unanimously. Id. The five to four plurality decision contained a strong
dissenting opinion. Id. Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion with Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joining. Id. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 392. Justice Powell stressed "a wide variety of factual situations"
could exist concerning release-dismissal agreements. Id. Justice O'Connor stated
more bluntly that in future cases a blanket rule should not decide a release-dismissal agreement's invalidity, but "that a case-by-case approach appropriately balances
the important interests on both sides of the question of the enforceability of these
agreements." Id. at 399-403 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Even the dissent agreed
"lilt may well be true that a full development of all the relevant facts would provide a legitimate justification for enforcing the release-dismissal agreement." Id. at
417 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Plurality and Concurrence

Concluding that release-dismissal agreements should not be invalidated per se, a plurality of the Court established three criteria to ascertain
the validity of release-dismissal agreements. 84 The Court stated that enforceability of a release-dismissal agreement depends on whether the facts
show that: (1) the criminal defendant entered into the agreement voluntarily;85 (2) the prosecutor had legitimate reasons for entering into the
agreement; 86 and (3) the agreement ultimately does not violate public
policy.

87

The Rumery Court first required that a criminal defendant enter into a
release-dismissal agreement voluntarily. 88 The Court reasoned that because in other instances, such as plea bargaining,8 9 criminal defendants
could validly relinquish constitutional rights, they should also be able to
choose whether to enter into release-dismissal agreements. 90 Nonetheless,
84. Id.

85. Id. at 387. Justice Powell stated that voluntary entry into a release-dismissal agreement "reflect[s] a highly rational judgment that the certain benefits of
escaping criminal prosecution exceed the speculative benefits of prevailing in a
civil action." Id.
86. Id. at 394-97.
87. Id. at 392-94.
88. Id. Justice O'Connor emphasized that the party relying on the releasedismissal agreement holds the burden of showing that the other party entered into

the agreement voluntarily. Id. at 399, 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 393. Plea bargaining represents the process whereby the accused
and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence.
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1152 (6th ed. 1990). Commentators suggest that plea
bargains are less detrimental to the criminal process than release-dismissal agreements. Francis, supra note 3, at 501-09 (discussing plea bargaining as compared to
release-dismissal agreements); cf. Thomas J. Foley, Plea BargainingIs: No Bargain!,
64 MICH. B.J. 505, 505-06 (June 1985) (arguing plea bargains are inherently coercive); Robert G. Fierer, Plea Bargainingin the American Courts: The Lady Is a Tiger,
TRIAL Vol. 19, No. 10 at 52, 57 (Oct. 1983) (arguing government holds unfair
advantage over criminal defendant in plea bargaining situations). See generally
GROSMAN, supra note 59, at 40-48 (discussing negotiations between criminal defendants and prosecutors); JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH
FOR IDENTrrv 208-10 (1980) (discussing policy reasons behind plea bargaining);Jay
A. Sigler, The Prosecutor: A Comparative FunctionalAnalysis, in THE PROSECUTOR 15,
66-67 (William F. McDonald, ed., 1979) (discussing plea bargaining).
90. Rumey, 480 U.S. at 393 (citing examples: Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding that prosecution is unit
and each member is presumed to know commitments any other member has
made); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1970) (holding that not every
guilty plea is invalid under the statute, even if fear of death was factor); Hoines v.
Barney's Club, Inc., 620 P.2d 628, 634 (Cal. 1980) (listing similarities between plea
bargaining and release-dismissal agreements: (1) circumstances that do not require full criminal penalty, (2) criminal defendant's desire to avoid risk of more
severe penalty at trial; and (3) state's desire to save time trial would require)); see
also Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978) (holding "not every burden
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the plurality conceded that cases may arise in which the risk, publicity and
expense of a criminal trial91 may intimidate defendants into waiving their
rights to bring seemingly meritorious claims. 92 Thus, the plurality explained that the facts of each case must be closely scrutinized to ensure
the defendant in fact decided voluntarily. 93 The concurrence specified
factors to consider in determining whether the decision was voluntary:
the knowledge and experience of the criminal defendant; the presence of
counsel; the nature of the pending criminal charges; the time the defendant had to review the agreement; and, the presence of judicial
94
supervision.
As the second element in validating a release-dismissal agreement, the
Rumey Court mandated an absence of prosecutorial overreaching. 95 The
Court conceded that the First Circuit concerns in Rumery v. Town of Newton
that prosecutors may "trump up charges in reaction to a defendant's civil
rights claim, [and] suppress evidence of police misconduct" 96 were warranted.9 7 The Court stated, however, that voiding all release-dismissal
agreements wrongfully assumes that prosecutors would otherwise seize the
opportunity for wrongdoing. 98 Therefore, the Court concluded that
on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement
to waive such a right, is invalid. Specifically, there is no per se rule against encouraging guilty pleas.") (footnote omitted); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213
(1971) (noting criminal defendant may have constitutional right, but Constitution
does not always forbid requiring the defendant to choose whether to exercise that
right); Fielkow, supra note 76, at 1137 (discussing similarities between plea bargaining and release-dismissal agreements); Sigler, supra note 89, at 67 (stating
criminal defendants enter into plea bargains voluntarily and therefore courts

should not interfere with plea bargains unless prosecutor has "unfairly burden [ed]
...defendant's

decision-making process") (citing Brady v. United States 397 U.S.
742 (1970)). But see Rumay, 480 U.S. at 393 n.3, 400 (recognizing analogy between
plea bargains and release-dismissal agreements is not complete when stating that
plea bargaining benefits are immediate and tangible while release-dismissal agreements are less so and that generally judges supervise plea bargains) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Fielkow, supra note 76, at 1136-37 (discussing Court's analogy to plea
bargaining and its faults); Bartholomy, supra note 5, at 341 (same).
91. Rumeay, 480 U.S. at 392-94. But see id. At 392 (stating mere possibility of
these risks fails to justify per se invalidation of release-dismissal agreements).
92. Id. at 393.
93. Id. at 391-98.

94. Id. Although not specifically listing these factors as requirements, the plurality used these factors in analyzing the specific facts of the Rumey case. Id. Justice O'Connor stressed that judicial supervision at the negotiations and signing of
the release-dismissal agreement would strongly support its validity. Id. at 402.
95. Id. at 398.
96. Id. at 394 (quoting Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 69 (1st Cir.
1985), rev'd, 480 U.S. 386 (1.987)).
97. Id.
98. Rumety, 480 U.S. at 395. The Court noted disciplinary rules for prosecutors who acted improperly were already in effect. Id. at 395 n.4 (citing MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY DR 7-105 (1980) (providing that "lawyer

shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter")).
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although it cannot be presumed that a prosecutor acted improperly when
entering into a release-dismissal agreement, a showing of prosecutorial
misconduct will invalidate a release-dismissal agreement. 99
Finally, the Supreme Court stated that to be valid, a release-dismissal
agreement cannot compromise public interests.' 00 The Court conceded
that release-dismissal agreements may prevent some meritorious section
1983 claims from vindicating constitutional violations. 1° 1 Nevertheless,
10 2
the Court emphasized that courts must consider other public interests,
such as the expense of litigation and the distraction of defendant officials
from their public duties.1l0 These factors may override other public inter104
ests, depending on the factual circumstances of each case.
B.

The Dissent

Relying on reasons similar to those the circuit courts used before the
Rumery decision, the dissent suggested a strong presumption against the
validity of release-dismissal agreements. 10 5 Although the dissent did not
99. Id.; cf. Hoines v. Barney's Club Inc., 620 P.2d 628, 633 (Cal. 1980) (stating
prosecutor has never been held to have compounded crime with promise to dismiss criminal charges in exchange for criminal defendant's release of civil rights).
This conclusion is consistent with decisions holding that courts must defer to
prosecutorial decisions and must presume prosecutors have acted properly. See,
e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); United States v. Goodwin, 457
U.S. 368 (1982); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (stating if prosecutor has probable cause to believe that criminal defendant committed crime,
prosecutor may decide whether or not to proceed). See generally MILLER, supranote
11, at 294 (explaining that public has no better alternative than to place confidence in public prosecutor) (quoting 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAw 257 (1958)).
The concurrence disagreed, however, suggesting that the party desiring to uphold
the release-dismissal must show an absence of prosecutorial misconduct. Rumely,
480 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting prosecutor must show lack of
prosecutorial misconduct, and absence of prosecutorial misconduct cannot be assumed as majority implies).
100. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 395.
101. Id. In addition, however, the majority stated that the individual defendant is not responsible for public interests. Id. Each individual may bring a civil
action on his or her own behalf, not on that of the general public. Id. Therefore,
each citizen may choose whether or not to bring a civil action. Id
102. Id. at 395.
103. Rumety, 480 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1986). In Rumey, the public interest was
the potential that the key witness in another case would be unwilling to testify to
aid in the conviction of an alleged sex offender. Id. at 389. The Court held that
the public interest in assisting in the conviction of an alleged felon outweighed the
importance of protecting the public from a person who had allegedly tampered
with a witness. Id.
104. Id. at 399-403 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For instance, in some cases
litigation will continue for many years. Id. Preparing for and defending oneself at
a trial compels time and attention. Id. As a result, police officers and other officials involved in a § 1983 claim will be less able to perform theirjobs effectively. Id.
105. For a discussion of the reasons offered by courts to justify the per se invalidity of release-dismissal agreements, see supra notes 20-75 and accompanying
text.
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adhere to the per se invalidation of release-dismissal agreements, the opin10 6
ion stated that release-dismissal agreements are "inherently coercive,"
07
prosecutors have conflicts of interests
and that courts should weigh
public interest more strongly against release-dismissal agreements than the
majority opinion suggests.' 0 8 Because of these factors, the dissenters advocated a case-by-case approach to determine whether a release-dismissal
agreement is valid, but with a presumption of invalidity. 10 9
IV.

THE EFFECr

OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

After the revolutionary Supreme Court decision in Town of Newton v.
Rumery,I1 0 the circuit courts were forced to stop the trend of per se invalida106. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In discussing the coerciveness ever-present in release dismissal agreements, the Court stated that a criminal defendants's voluntariness and rationality were insufficient to validate release-

dismissal agreements. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that requiring only voluntariness would allow the price of the release to equal the price of
the dismissal. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further stated that the
release certainly was not equal in price to the dismissal. Id. The dissent illustrated
this idea by stating such a basis would allow the enforceability of a promise to pay a
state trooper $20 in exchange for not issuing a ticket for a traffic violation. Id. at
408 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Many courts previously used the term "inherently
coercive" when describing release-dismissal agreements. See, e.g., Hall v. Ochs, 817
F.2d 920, 923-24 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding prosecutor's repeated suggestion to criminal defendant to enter into release-dismissal agreement and threat of continued
imprisonment showed coercion); Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc., 620 P.2d 628, 637
(Cal. 1980) (Tobriner, J., dissenting) (recognizing threat of imprisonment coerces
criminal defendants into signing release-dismissal agreements, because such agreements are only way to attain freedom). See generally Fielkow, supra note 76, at 114142 (discussing coerciveness inherent in release-dismissal agreements); Bartholomy,
supra note 5 (same). For a discussion of the majority's reasoning that a showing of
voluntariness must be evident in order for a release-dismissal agreement to be
valid, see supra notes 85, 88-94 and accompanying text.
107. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Rumery, the dissent
stated that conflicting prosecutorial interests exist because the prosecutor is always
representing both public and police interests. Id. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
As a result of these conflicts, prosecutorial abuses may occur. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). For instance, a prosecutor may make criminal charges that probable
cause does not support, although Rule 3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct requires a prosecutor to have probable cause before that prosecutor
brings charges. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of the prosecutor's function and the potential for abuse of discretion, see supra notes 50-71
and accompanying text.
108. Rumevy, 480 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized
that public interests generally cause the release-dismissal agreements to be void.
Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The congressional intent in § 1983 demanded
that there exist a "strong presumption against validity." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Stevens repeatedly stated that the criminal defendant
remains innocent as a matter of law. Id. at 404, 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of legislative intent of § 1983, see supra notes 6-8, 34, 40-51 and accom-

panying text. For a discussion of the plurality and concurring opinions' weighing
of the public interests, see supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
109. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 405-07.
110. 480 U.S. 386 (1986).
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tion of release-dismissal agreements. As a result, courts began permitting
the use of some release-dismissal agreements, depending on the facts of
the case."' In evaluating the validity of release-dismissal agreements, the
circuit courts employed the Rumery Court criteria: presence of voluntariness, absence of prosecutorial misconduct and weight of public
11 2
interests.
A.

Voluntariness

The Supreme Court mandated a showing of voluntariness when signing the release-dismissal agreement.11 3 Although the concurrence listed
some factors indicating voluntariness, 114 the plurality gave little indication
on how voluntariness should be determined. 1 5 As a result, circuit courts
further defined voluntariness by noting factors dependant on the facts
of each case"1 6 that indicated the absence or presence of voluntariness.11 7 These factors include elements evidencing the criminal defendant's state of mind, such as: (1) absence of coercion; 118 (2) lack of un111. The courts adopted the case-by-case approach suggested in Town of
Newton v. Rumaey. See Rumety, 480 U.S. at 392 (stating case-by-case determination is
needed to decide if release-dismissal agreement is valid and stating "wide variety of
factual situations ... can result in release-dismissal agreements") (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Hill v. Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding release-dismissal agreement based on facts of case); Livingstone v. North Belle
Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205, 1210-11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1095 (3d Cir. 1988) and stating release-dismissal agreement may be valid depending upon facts and circumstances
surrounding case); Vallone v. Lee, 7 F.3d 196, 199 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting Rumey
clarified that not all release-dismissal agreements are invalid, depending on facts of
each case); Coughlen v. Coots, 5 F.3d 970, 974 (6th Cir. 1993) (listing instances
when release-dismissal would be valid prosecutorial tool); Woods v. Rhodes, 994
F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Justice O'Connor's observation that courts
must engage in case-by-case analysis in determining whether release-dismissal
agreement is valid); Berry v. Peterson, 887 F.2d 635, 639 (5th Cir. 1989) (enforcing
release-dismissal agreement in instant case).
112. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's discussion of the following factors: (1) the presence of voluntariness; (2) the absence of prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the consideration to public interests, see supra notes 84-109 and
accompanying text.
113. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 393-94.
114. For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's notes on voluntariness, see supra
note 94 and accompanying text.
115. Rumeay, 480 U.S. at 393-94. Nevertheless, the plurality did state fact specific factors indicating voluntariness, such as the criminal defendant having an experienced lawyer representing him or her. Id. at 394. For a discussion of the
plurality's vague requirements for determining whether voluntariness exists, see
supra note 94 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of the case-by-case analysis procedure, see supra notes
93, 104 and accompanying text.
117. Hill v. Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1993); Woods v. Rhodes, 994
F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1993); Berry v. Peterson, 887 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1989). For a
discussion of specific factors and cases in which they have been used, see infra
notes 118-47 and accompanying text.
118. Berry, 887 F.2d at 639.
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willingness;' 1 9 (3) sophistication of the signer; 120 (4) lack of freedom of
the signer at the time of signing;1' 1 and (5) time constraints on the signer. 122 In addition, courts considered outside elements: (1) competence
of counsel;12 3 (2) signer's receipt of a benefit versus the cost; 12 4 (3) clarity and fairness of the release-dismissal agreement; 125 (4) supervision
119. Id. at 639-40; see also Woods, 994 F.2d at 500.
120. Rumry, 480 U.S. at 394; Woods, 994 F.2d at 499; Beny, 887 F.2d at 639
(considering literacy of criminal defendant as indication of voluntariness). But see
Hill 12 F.3d at 578 (determining lack of sophistication of criminal defendant was
off-set by knowledge and experience of defendant's attorney); Lynch v. City of
Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989) (considering criminal defendant's
familiarity with criminal process when determining presence of voluntariness);
U.S. DEP'TJuSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME ANDJUSTICE 31-32, 39 (1983)
[hereinafter JusricE DEP'T
and uneducated).

REPORT]

(reporting criminal suspects tend to be young

121. Rumey, 480 U.S. at 394; Hil4 12 F.3d at 578; Vallone v. Lee, 7 F.3d 196,
199 n.5 (11th Cir. 1993) (determining defendant being in jail at time of signing

release-dismissal agreement showed involuntariness); Woods, 994 F.2d at 499;
Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1127 (stating criminal defendant not being in custody aided in

showing voluntariness); Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 923-24 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding
signing involuntary when criminal defendant was forced to sign release in order to
get out ofjail); see also Miranda v. Aiizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966) (stating "compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation, and not an independent decision on his part, caused the defendant" to waive his Fifth Amendment rights).
122. Rumey, 480 U.S. at 394; Hil 12 F.3d at 578 (noting that considering
agreement for two months indicates voluntariness); Vallone, 7 F.3d at 199 n.5
(holding defendant's lack of deliberation aided in showing his involuntariness
when signing the release-dismissal agreement); Woods, 994 F.2d at 499-500 (stating
whether or not defendant was in custody is factor when considering voluntariness
element of release-dismissal agreement); Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1127 (noting criminal
defendant considered agreement for four weeks before signing it, indicating
voluntariness).
123. Berry, 887 F.2d at 639-40; see also Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394; HiA 12 F.3d at
578 (holding unsophisticated client entered into agreement voluntarily because
competent attorney represented him); VaUone, 7 F.3d at 199 n.5 (stating defendant's lack of representation indicated involuntariness when signing release-dismissal agreement); Woods, 994 F.2d at 499 (listing sophistication of criminal defendant
as consideration in determining voluntariness); Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1127 (considering competent representation of criminal defendant indication of voluntariness).
But seeJusTicx DEP'T REPORT, supra note 120, at 57 (commenting that most crimi-

nal defendants are not represented by zealous private attorneys, instead, over 50%
of all felony defendants are eligible for legal service representation because of poverty level); R. MICHALOWSI, ORDER, LAW,

AND

CRIME 213 (1985) (declaring indi-

gent criminal defendants do not have benefit of "skilled and experienced counsel"
as a result of chronic underfunding and understaffing of public defender offices).
124. Rumeyy, 480 U.S. at 394; Woods, 994 F.2d at 499; Bery, 887 F.2d at 639.
125. Berry, 887 F.2d at 640; see also Vallone, 7 F.3d at 199 (holding that defendant had right to be let out on bail regardless of voluntariness shown when he

signed agreement exchanging release on bail for waiver of civil rights); Woods, 994
F.2d at 500 (considering fairness of agreement to be factor when considering voluntariness of criminal defendant); Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1127 (considering criminal
defendant's counsel drafting release-dismissal agreement to be indication of
voluntariness).
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by the court; 12 6 and (5) severity of the charges against the defen12 7
dant.
B.

Public Interests IncludingProsecutorialOverreaching

The circuit courts have followed the Rumery decision holding that release-dismissal agreements are not per se void as against public policy. 128
In interpreting Rumeiy, the circuit courts have listed policy justifications
for a prosecutor to enter into release-dismissal agreements.' 2 9 Thesejustifications include, but are not limited to, the following situations: (1) the
prosecutor cannot uncover the truth surrounding the allegations; (2) the
prosecution cost outweighs the benefit resulting from a conviction; (3) the
evidence is weak even though the criminal charges were filed in good
faith; (4) the witnesses or evidence are no longer available; (5) evidence
subsequently found points to the defendant's innocence in the criminal
case; and (6) the criminal charges are not the product of prosecutorial
misconduct and both sides benefit substantially from a balanced settlement by avoidance of exposure to potential liability.13 °
Like the*Supreme Court, the circuit courts require a showing of an
absence of prosecutorial overreaching to uphold a release-dismissal agreement. 3 1 Nevertheless, only the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has required an actual demonstration that criminal charges were not
126. Hil 12 F.3d at 578 (noting state judge supervision of release-dismissal
agreement); see also Rumery, 480 U.S. at 399-403 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating court supervision of release-dismissal agreements would show record indicating voluntariness or lack thereof).

127. Hilg 12 F.3d at 578.
128. See, e.g., Rumery, 480 U.S. at 391 (stating release-dismissal agreements
may be valid in some circumstances); Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough,
12 F.3d 1205, 1210-11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v.

City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1095 (3d Cir. 1988) and stating release-dismissal agreement may be valid depending upon facts and circumstances surrounding that
case); Hill 12 F.3d at 578 (upholding release-dismissal agreement); Cain v. Darby
Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that although Rumery rejected
view that release-dismissal agreements were per se adverse to public interest, "[w ] e
see no reason to embrace the opposite extreme that voluntary release-dismissal
agreements are per se beneficial to the public interest"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1303
(1994); Vallone, 7 F.3d at 199 (noting Rumery clarified that not all release-dismissal
agreement are invalid); Coughlen v. Coots, 5 F.3d 970, 973-75 (6th Cir. 1993) (listing instances when release-dismissal would be valid prosecutorial tool); Woods, 994
F.2d at 499 (citingJustice O'Connor's observation that courts must engage in caseby-case analysis in determining whether release-dismissal agreement is valid in
Rumery); Berry, 887 F.2d at 636 (enforcing release-dismissal agreement); Lynch, 880
F.2d at 1122 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding release-dismissal agreement enforceable if it
remains in public interest).
129. Hill 12 F.3d at 578; Coughlen, 5 F.3d at 973-75.
130. HilL 12 F.3d at 578; Coughlen, 5 F.3d 973-75.
131. HilL 12 F.3d at 578; Coughlen, 5 F.3d at 973-74; Berry, 887 F.2d at 642.
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Exhibiting a broader approach, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that when no evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct exists, criminal charges are assumed valid. 13 3 The majority of
the circuit courts, however, have not directly addressed prosecutorial misconduct, but instead have considered prosecutorial misconduct in deter3
mining whether release-dismissal agreements violate public policy.'

V.

4

THE THIRD CIRCUIT INTERPRETATION

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
addressed for the first time the validity of release-dismissal agreements in
two cases.' 3 5 The Third Circuit focused on the voluntariness aspect in
Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough'3 6 and on the public policy question in Cain v. Darry Borough.' 3 7 In both cases, the court analyzed the facts
using the criteria the Supreme Court set forth in the Rumery decision.' 3 8
A.

VoluntarinessElement Restricted

In Livingstone, the criminal defendant had allegedly taken her
grandchild, locked herself in a room, and resisted the police when they
came to retrieve the child.' 3 9 Thereafter, the police charged the defendant with disorderly conduct, aggravated assault, terroristic threats, resisting
arrest and interference with custody. 14 0 The criminal defendant claimed
that during her arrest the police hit her, dragged her through the mud
and shot her in the vagina with a tranquilizer gun. 14 1 The prosecutor arranged a release-dismissal agreement to which the criminal defendant
agreed. 4 2 The agreement stated that Washington Township would pay
any medical or household damage bills that the criminal defendant incurred during her arrest if she waived her right to a civil suit against the
township and police.' 43 Questioning the validity of the release-dismissal
132. Hill 12 F.3d at 578. The court stated that the evidence showed that the
prosecutor made criminal charges before he discovered that the criminal defendant was filing a civil suit. Id.
133. Beny, 887 F.2d at 640-41. The release-dismissal agreement itself represented the only evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. In Rumety, the releasedismissal agreement also constituted the only evidence of prosecutorial overreaching. Id. Both courts held that the release-dismissal agreement alone does not establish prosecutorial misconduct. Id.
134. Id.
135. Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205, 1210-11 (3d

Cir. 1993); Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1303 (1994).
136. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1210-11.
137. Cain, 7 F.3d at 380.
138. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1210-11; Cain, 7 F.3d at 377.
139. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1207.
140. Id.
141. Id.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 1208.
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agreement in the pursuant trial, the district court interpreted Rumery
144
broadly and upheld the validity of the release-dismissal agreement.
Although the district court upheld the release-dismissal agreement,

the Third Circuit reversed.'

45

The Third Circuit noted that although re-

lease-dismissal agreements are not per se invalid, if the criminal defendant
entered into the agreement involuntarily, the agreement is void. 146 In this
case, the Third Circuit decided the release-dismissal agreement was invalid
because the criminal defendant had not voluntarily agreed to the terms of
the agreement.' 47 The Third Circuit based its conclusion on factors similar to those other circuits have used. 148 In determining that the releasedismissal agreement was invalid, the most influential factors for the Third
Circuit were that the agreement, although made before a judge, 14 9 was
oral,1s ° and that the criminal defendant contemplated the agreement for
only ten minutes.' 5 ' Because the United States Supreme Court in Rumery
determined that release-dismissal agreements are not per se invalid but
must be decided on a case-by-case analysis, the facts of each case prejudice
the outcome of that particular case. 152 When interpreting Rumery, the Liv144. Id.
145. Id. at 1211.
146. Id. at 1210-11.
147. Id. at 1211.
148. Id. at 1210-11. For a discussion of the factors of voluntariness used in
other courts, see supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
149. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1210-11. No on-the-record statement existed to
show the involvement of the judge. Id. Justice Powell emphasized the importance
of the presence of ajudge at the signing of a release-dismissal agreement. Town of
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 401 (1986). Other courts also discussed the benefits of a judge's presence. Hill v. Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1993).
150. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1212. The court noted it was not holding that oral
release-dismissal agreements can never be valid. Id. Nevertheless, no circuit court
had yet upheld or even considered an oral release-dismissal agreement. Id. Courts
prefer written agreements because modification can be made, deliberation is facilitated and bargaining is more evident. Id. In addition, the Supreme Court and
other courts often refer to the "signer" and the "signing" of the agreement, suggesting that it is written. Id.
151. Id. at 1214-15. The court compared these facts to those in Rumery and
concluded that the facts differed substantially. Id. In Rumery, the criminal defendant made a voluntary decision to enter into the agreement. Id. In that case, the
Court held the decision was voluntary because the criminal defendant was sophisticated, he was not in jail, and he had three days to consider the agreement. Id. For
a discussion of the voluntariness issue in Rumery, see supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Rumey, 480 U.S. at 391 (stating case-by-case determination is
needed to decide if release-dismissal agreement is valid and stating that "wide
variety of factual situations . . . can result in release-dismissal agreements")

(O'Connor, J., concurring); Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1095 (3d Cir. 1988) and stating

that release-dismissal agreement may be valid depending upon facts and circumstances surrounding case); Hill v. Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding release-dismissal agreement based on its facts); Vallone v. Lee, 7 F.3d 196,
199 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that Rumety clarified that not all release-dismissal
agreements are invalid depending on facts); Coughlen v. Coots, 5 F.3d 970, 973-75
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ingstone court explained that courts should consider factors "vary[ing] in
each case and depend[ing] upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the waiving party."155 Therefore, in determining whether voluntariness existed, the Livingstone court stressed the particular facts of the
54
case.'
The Livingstone court began its analysis by stating that voluntariness
requires more than an absence of coercion 5 5 -it compels an assent that
Rumery described as voluntary, deliberate and informed.' 5 6 In Livingstone,
the Third Circuit emphasized that two factors demonstrate the criminal
defendant entered into the agreement involuntarily.' 5 7 First, the agreement was oral. 158 Second, the criminal defendant had very little time to
reflect on the terms of the release-dismissal agreement. 159 Based on these
factors showing an absence of voluntariness, the court struck down the
60
release-dismissal agreement.'
B.

Public Policy Element Stressed

In Cain v. Darby Borough, the Third Circuit emphasized the Rumery
public policy requirement.' 6 ' In Cain, the criminal defendant waived her
right to bring a suit under section 1983 against three municipalities, their
respective police departments and a number of individual police officers
in exchange for admission into the Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition
Program (ARD).162 The Third Circuit held that the public policy require(6th Cir. 1993) (listing instances when release-dismissal would be valid
prosecutorial tool); Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing
Justice O'Connor's observation that courts must engage in case-by-case analysis in
determining whether release-dismissal agreement is valid); Berry v. Peterson, 887
F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1989) (enforcing release-dismissal agreement).
153. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1211 (quotations omitted).
154. Id. For a discussion of the factors of voluntariness in Rumery, see supra
notes 88-94 and accompanying text. For a discussion of what factors the circuit
courts emphasized when interpreting voluntariness, see supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
155. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1211 (citing Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494, 499
(8th Cir. 1993) and Berry v. Peterson, 887 F.2d 635, 640 (5th Cir. 1989)).
156. Id. (quoting Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1212.
159. Id. at 1214-15. The criminal defendant had ten minutes to deliberate.

Id.
160. Id.
161. Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1303 (1994). The court did not consider the voluntariness requirement because it
was obviously satisfied on these facts. Id.
162. Id. at 379. Cain was arrested for "several violations of the Pennsylvania
Criminal Code of Crimes and Offenses resulting from her disorderly and assaultive
behavior." Id. Cain claimed that the arresting officers used excessive force. Id.
The prosecutor offered Cain Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition (ARD) in exchange for waiving her right to a civil suit against the officers. Id. ARD is a pro-
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ment had not been fulfilled and therefore the release-dismissal agreement
163
was invalid.
Following the Rumery decision, the Cain court found that a case-bycase approach remains appropriate when considering whether public pol16
icy interests outweigh the need to enforce release-dismissal agreements.
In arguing that public policy concerns outweigh the benefits of this specific release-dismissal agreement, the Cain court addressed both the waiver
1
of the section 1983 claim and the dismissal of the criminal charges. 6
The Third Circuit maintained that the availability of section 1983 actions contains strong public policy interests because the actions make
whole those whose constitutional rights have been violated.' 66 Because
release-dismissal agreements may bar citizens' colorable section 1983
claims, the agreements are against the public interest.' 6 7 Therefore, the
party seeking to uphold a release-dismissal agreement must show that
other public interests favor enforcement and that the prosecutor has entered into the release-dismissal agreement for those public policy
168
reasons.
In Cain, the court held that the release-dismissal agreement adversely
impacted public concerns because of the prosecutor's blanket policy that
all criminal defendants who enter the ARD programs must sign a release
form. 169 Thus, the prosecutor's policy disrupted social interests because it
was motivated by a desire for blanket immunity from suit, not a desire to
encourage government thrift and providence by preventing frivolous litigation.' 70 The Third Circuit concluded the prosecutor must consider
whether the result of allowing admission of the criminal defendant in the
ARD program constituted a potential risk to society and whether the criminal defendant possessed a likelihood of rehabilitative success.' 71 Because
the prosecutor did not consider these factors, but instead used a blanket
gram that allows the prosecutor to move the court to place a defendant on
probation without a trial. Id. If a defendant successfully completes the probation
period, the charges against him or her are dropped. Id.
163. Id. at 383.
164. Id. at 380.

165. See generally Fielkow, supra note 76 (considering both dismissal of criminal charges and release of right to bring civil action); Kreimer, supra note 1
(same); Bartholomy, supra note 5 (same); Francis, supra note 3 (same); Rogan,
supra note 6 (same).

166. Cain, 7 F.3d at 380.
167. Id. at 380-81. The court declared that citizens who bring meritorious

§ 1983 claims to vindicate constitutional rights advance social interests by preventing future official misconduct. Id. at 381.
168. Id. The Third Circuit noted that in Rumey, the prosecutor had a reason
to pursue an agreement independent of any other reason and legitimately related
to his duties as a prosecutor. Id.
169. Id. at 379.
170. Id.
171. Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1303 (1994).
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policy, the Cain court held that the release-dismissal agreement was invalid
17 2
as against public policy.
VI.

IMPACT ON FuTuRE THIRD CIRCUIT DECISIONS

Because courts will consider each case on its facts, and every factual
situation will vary, predicting the outcome of each case remains difficult. 178 Nonetheless, courts develop tendencies. As a result, practitioners
should consider previous factual circumstances to determine potential arguments for their clients. 174 In addition, attorneys representing potential
litigants should note the considerations various courts have stressed in the
175
past.
Significantly, the Third Circuit has never upheld a release-dismissal
agreement.1 76 Therefore, concluding that the Third Circuit determines
the validity of release-dismissal agreements conservatively would be appropriate. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit has only decided two cases relating
to the validity of release-dismissal agreements.' 77 Both of these cases contained one extreme factor weighing against the validity of the release-dismissal agreement in question: (1) in Livingstone, the agreement was oral,
and (2) in Cain, the agreement was based on a blanket policy. 178
When considering the voluntariness factor, the Third Circuit interpreted the Rumery Court's criteria as requiring a strong showing of voluntariness to validate the release-dismissal agreement.' 79 For example, in
Livingstone, the court maintained that written agreements readily demonstrate voluntariness because they provide evidence of deliberation, modification and bargaining power.' 8 0 Nonetheless, the Livingstone court
specifically noted that it was not holding as a matter of law that all oral
172. Id.
173. For a discussion of case-by-case analysis, see supranotes 93, 109, 111, 152
and accompanying text.

174. For a discussion of various fact patterns in cases following Rumey, see
notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of the factors courts have used in the past to determine
the validity of release-dismissal agreements, see supra notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
176. Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205 (3d Cir.
1993); Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1303 (1994).
177. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1210-11; Cain, 7 F.3d at 377.
178. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1210-12; Cain, 7 F.3d at 377.
179. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1210-12.
180. Id. at 1212-13. Courts stress the time elapsed to consider release-dismissal agreements when determining if voluntariness existed. See, e.g., Town of
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (considering criminal defendant had
extended time to review release-dismissal agreement); Hill v. City of Cleveland, 12
F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1993) (considering time element in determining existence
of voluntariness); Vallone v. Lee, 7 F.3d 196, 199 n.5 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting
defendant's lack of deliberation aided in showing his involuntariness when signing
release-dismissal agreement); Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494, 497, 499-500 (8th
Cir. 1993) (considering fact that signer reviewed release-dismissal agreement for
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release-dismissal agreements are void; the court merely stressed that oral
agreements compel an "even more scrupulous review by the courts" than
written agreements."" Thus, the Third Circuit has strongly manifested its
unwillingness to uphold an oral release-dismissal agreement.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit also failed to weigh heavily factors
that other courts have considered significant elements for validating release-dismissal agreements. 182 For example, in Livingstone, even the presence of a judge during the making of the release-dismissal agreement did
not sufficiently demonstrate voluntariness. 183 By contrast, in other cases,
ajudge presiding over agreements strongly indicated voluntariness. 18 4 As
a result, in future determinations of the validity of release-dismissal agreements, the Third Circuit may not consider the presence of a judge at all
during the formation of an agreement, or other elements relevant in
other jurisdictions.
Moreover, the Third Circuit additionally interpreted the public interest issue conservatively.' 85 In denying the validity of a blanket release-dismissal agreement, the Third Circuit construed the Rumery criteria as
requiring a prosecutor to individually assess each release-dismissal agreetwo months); Lynch v. City of Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989) (considering criminal defendant kept release-dismissal agreement for four weeks).
Courts considering release-dismissal agreements have also noted that modification to the agreement can show voluntariness. See, e.g., Woods, 994 F.2d at 497
(noting parties changed terms after original release-dismissal agreement was
presented); Berry v. Peterson, 887 F.2d 635, 638 (5th Cir. 1989) (considering criminal defendant's attorney revised release-dismissal before signing).
Finally, many courts consider a demonstration of bargaining power a factor.
Rumety, 480 U.S. at 394 (drafting by criminal defendant's attorney shows voluntari-

ness); Vallone, 7 F.3d at 198 (stating district attorney's preparation and refusal to
change agreement evidence of involuntariness); Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1127 (stating

that drafting by criminal defendant's attorney shows voluntariness); Hammond v.
Bales, 843 F.2d 1320, 1322 (10th Cir. 1988) (voluntariness shown through criminal

defendant's attorney drafting release-dismissal agreement); Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d
920, 923-24 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating threat of continued incarceration indicated
involuntariness); see also Rogan, supra note 6, at 526-30 (discussing contractual aspects of release-dismissal agreements). For a discussion of the Rumety Court's consideration of these factors, see supra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
181. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1211-12. No court of appeals has considered an
oral release-dismissal agreement. Id. The Rumey Court did not address the possibility of an oral release-dismissal agreement. In fact, the dissent in Rumery implied
that release-dismissal agreements are always written. Id. (citing Town of Newton v.
Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 417 n.22 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (implying signature on release-dismissal agreement exists)).
182. For a discussion of factors other circuits have considered important, see
supra notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
183. Livingstone, 12 F.3d 1210-12. Justice O'Connor stressed this aspect in
Rumey. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 399-403 (1987) (O'ConnorJ.,
concurring).
184. Rumy, 480 U.S. at 398 n.10; Hill v. City of Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575, 578
(6th Cir. 1993).
185. Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.

1303 (1994).
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ment. 18 6 The prosecutor must evaluate the assessment in light of its effect
on the public, instead of the policy as a whole.' 8 7 This determination indicates that prosecutors must tailor all such future policies to address all
88
relevant factors surrounding particular criminal defendants' situations.'
Blanket policies, such as the ARD policy in Cain, fail to validate the public
interest requirement for release-dismissal agreements. 18 9 Consequently,
the Third Circuit will probably mandate the government show that the
prosecutor entered into a release-dismissal agreement due to a belief that
a release-dismissal agreement would best remedy the individual situation.
As a result of Livingstone and Cain, the Third Circuit will most likely
require the prosecutor to present strong evidence of voluntariness and of
best interests of the public in each particular case. 190 In doing so, the
Third Circuit appears to be side-stepping the criteria the Rumery decision
imposed. The Third Circuit has evaluated release-dismissal agreements by
using only the Rumey criteria that will lead to a determination of invalidity. 19 1 Thus, the Third Circuit has blatantly ignored other factors that
192
other jurisdictions have used to uphold release-dismissal agreements.
The Third Circuit's form of bias analysis is practically a Third Circuit ruling of per se invalidity of release-dismissal agreements.
Because the Third Circuit approach is so inherently conservative, the
Supreme Court may again hear the controversial issue of release-dismissal
agreements' constitutional validity. If the Third Circuit's judicial conservatism spreads, the per se rule of invalidity may be reinstated; 193 or prosecu194
tors may continue to reduce the use of release-dismissal agreements.
Andrea Hyatt
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. For a discussion of these criteria, see supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205 (3d
Cir. 1993); Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1303 (1994). For a detailed analysis of these cases, see supra notes 135-72.
192. For a discussion of factors used by various jurisdictions, see supra notes
116-34 and accompanying text.
193. But see JACOBY, supra note 89, at 208-09 (citing NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMM'N OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRIALS, COURTS 46 (U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1973)).
194. See generally Kreimer, supra note 1 (discussing decline in several area
prosecutors' usage of release-dismissal agreements).
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